THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE PATENT LAW by MONTAGUE, GILBERT H.
YALE
LAW JOURNAL
Vol. XXI APRIL, 1912 No. 6
THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE
PATENT LAW*
By Gilbert H. Montague, of the New York Bar.
"Formerly in England," wrote Mr. Justice Story in 1839,'
"courts of law were disposed to indulge in a very close and strict
construction of the specifications accompanying patents and
expressing the nature and extent of the invention. This con-
struction seems to have been adopted upon the notion that patent
rights were in the nature of monopolies, and, therefore, were to
be narrowly watched and construed with a rigid adherence to
their terms, as being in derogation of the general rights of the
community." The reasons for this English view, which have
been admirably set forth in a brilliant historical chapter by Pro-
fessor Robinson,2 go back to the Elizabethan struggle against
monopoly and the famous Statute against Monopolies (21 Jac.,
I Ch. 3, A. D., 1623) which in sweeping terms abolished all
monopolies, and denied the power of the crown to grant them in
the future, except only in cases where such grants had been or
* EDITors NOTEs-The decision of the Supreme Court in Henry v. A. B.
Dick Co. was announced March 11, 1912, while this article was in press.
It -has not yet been officially reported, but the unofficial reports indicate
that the majority opinion bears out all the points made by Mr. Montague
in this article. In view of the great public interest aroused by the decision,
it will be discussed in an article by Mr. Montague in a future issue of the
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I Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Sumner, 535, 539.
2 Robinson: Patents, Introduction, Chapter II, Section 11-44.
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should be made to the inventors of new manufactures, conferring
upon them the exclusive privilege of practising such. inventions
for a limited period of time.
These reasons, and the causes out of which they naturally had
grown in England, need not here detain us. In America these
causes have never existed, and these reasons for jealousy of the
inventor's privilege were never manifest. When the Constitution
was adopted, the subject was approached in the spirit of the
utmost liberality to the inventor. Article I, Section 8, Subdivision
8, provides that Congress shall have power "to promote the
progress of science and useful arts by securing, for limited times,
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries." Contemporary records of the debates
in the Constitutional Convention and of the great popular dis-
cussion which preceded the adoption of the Constitution by the
several states show that to this clause of the Constitution was
accorded the almost unique distinction of universal approval.
Mr. Justice Story, therefore, was well within the mark, when he
wrote, in continuation of his opinion above quoted: "At present,
a far more liberal and expanded view of the subject is taken.
Patents for inventions are now treated as a just reward to ingen-
ious men, and as highly beneficial to the public, not only by holding
out suitable encouragements to genius and talents and enterprise,
but as ultimately securing to the whole community great advan-
tages from the free communication of secrets and processes and
machinery, which may be most important to all the great interests
of society-to agriculture, to commerce, and to manufactures,
as well as to the cause of science and art. In America this liberal
view of the subject has always been taken, and indeed it is a nat-
ural, if not a necessary result from the very language and intent
of the power given to Congress, by the Constitution on this sub-
ject." From the historical point of view, at any rate, Professor
Robinson's conclusion3 is sound that
"the nature of the patent privilege, as thus disclosed by its effects
on the relations of the inventor and the public toward the inven-
tion, proves that it possesses both the characteristics of a true
monopoly; (i) It confers on the inventor an exclusive right to
which he is not naturally entitled, and which he could neither
claim nor enforce except through the arbitrary interposition of
the law; (2) It restricts the public in its enjoyment of three inval-
3 Robinson: Patents, Section 32.
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uable rights, without the exercise of which, in some form, all
progress in the industrial arts would be impossible. It differs
from an odious monopoly in this: that in the odious monopoly the
public are deprived of some existing method of enjoying these
rights, while the patent privilege prevents their exercise only in
the new direction marked out by the discovery of the inventor.
But in both cases the rights restricted are the same, and the
effect on their enjoyment after the monopoly is granted is identi-
cal. That a patent privilege is a true monopoly, derogatory to
common right, is, therefore, the correct theory concerning it, con-
sidered in itself."
Somewhat more than a hundred years after this monopolistic
privilege had been secured to inventors by the Constitution, the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act was passed. Section I of this act pro-
vided in part as follows: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or com-
merce, among the several states or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal." Section 2 provided in part as follows:
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,'
any part of the trade or commerce among the several states,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor * * *"
Instead of resting, like the patent laws, upon an express definite-
provision of the Constitution, the Sherman Act rested upon an
implication from that indefinite provision of the Constitution which
authorized Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states." Indeed, the history of the bill
before its passage shows that its sponsors experienced no little
difficulty in discovering sufficient constitutional basis on which to
construct the statute.4
How far this statute, of comparatively recent date, affects or
controls the monopolistic privileges secured, since the birth of the
republic, to inventors by patent laws enacted pursuant to the
express provisions of the Constitution, is the subject which will
be discussed in this paper.
II.
Prominent in the development of the law on this subject is the
many sided litigation relating to the patents of the National Har-
4 Congressional Record, Vol. 19, p. 7513; Vol. 20, pp. 1167-1169; Vol.
21, pp. 1460, 1770, 2460-2467, 2607-2608, 2567-2568, 2657. See also Prentice:
Federal Power Over Carriers and Corporations, 161-168.
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row Company, which eventually culminated in Bement v. National
Harrow Company.5 In this case, the National Harrow Company
sued Bement to recover damages arising out of a violation by
Bement of certain contracts executed between the parties relating
to the manufacture and sale of spring tooth harrows, to restrain
future violation of such contracts, and to compel specific perform-
ance by Bement. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals of New York, and the case was brought to the
Supreme Court by writ of ei-ror and was there affirmed. The
only federal question raised was as to the validity of the contracts
with regard to the Sherman Act. Justice Peckham, writing the
opinion of the Court, said that "the first important and most
material fact in considering this question is that the agreements
concern articles protected by letters patent of the Government of
the United States." The plaintiff, continued Judge Peckham,
"was, therefore, the owner of a monopoly recognized by the Con-
stitution and by the statutes of Congress. An owner of a
pateift has the right to sell it or to keep it; to manufacture the
article himself or to license others to manufacture it; to sell such
article himself or to authorize others to sell it."
He quoted with approval Heaton-Peninsular Company v.
Eureka Specialty Co.,6 as follows:
"If he sees fit, he may reserve to himself the exclusive use of
his invention or discovery. If he will neither use his device nor
permit others to use it, he has but suppressed his own. That the
grant is made upon the reasonable expectation that he will either
put his invention to practical use or permit others to avail them-
selves of it upon reasonable terms is doubtless true. This expec-
tatioi is based alone upon the supposition that the patentee's inter-
est will induce him to use, or let others use, his invention. The
public has retained no other security to enforce such expectations.
His title is exclusive, and so clearly within the constitutional pro-
visions in respect to private property that he is neither bound to
use his discovery himself nor permit-others to use it."
Justice Peckham then mentioned two exceptions to this rule of
absolute freedom in the use or sale of patented privileges; namely,
the exercise of the police power of the state, as for instance in
condemning an improvement for burning oil as unsafe for illum-
inating purposes under the statute, 7 and the invalidity of agree-
186 U. S., 70, 1902.
G 77 Fed., 288, C. C. A. 6th C., 1896.
7 Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S., 501.
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ments which forbade telephone licensees operating public tele-
phone lines to serve other telephone companies within their dis-
tricts.8  Justice Peckham then continued:
"Notwithstanding these exceptions, the general rule is absolute
freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the
United States. The very object of these laws is monopoly, and
the rule is, with few exceptions, that any conditions which are not
in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of property,
imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the license for the right
to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the
courts. The fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up
the monopoly or fix prices does not render them illegal."
Justice Peckham stated that the contracts in question included
interstate commerce within their provisions and then came back
to the question "whether the agreement between these parties with
relation to these patented articles is valid within the act of Con-
gress." He referred to the rule, established in United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Association,9 United States v. Joint
Traffic Association,10 and Addystone Pipe, Etc., Co. v. United
States,"' to the effect that " the act included any restraint of com-
merce, whether reasonable or unreasonable," and added:
"But that statute clearly does not refer to that kind of a
restraint of interstate commerce which may arise from reasonable
and legal conditions imposed upon the assignee or licensee of a
patent by the owner thereof, restricting the terms upon which the
article may be used and the price to be demanded therefor. Such
a construction of the act we have no doubt was never contem-
plated by its framers."
Justice Peckham then examined the various provisions of the
agreement, and held that none of them constituted a violation of
the Sherman Act. The provision in regard to the price at which
the licensee would sell the article manufactured under the license,
he stated,
"tended to keep up the price of the implements manufactured and
sold, but that was only recognizing the nature of the property
dealt in, and providing for its value so far as possible. This the
parties were legally entitled to do. The owner of a patented arti-
cle can, of course, charge such price as he may choose, and the
sMissouri ex rel, etc., v. Bell Telephone Co., 23 Fed., 539, and other
cases collected in 186 U. S., 70, 90-91.
9 166 U. S., 290.
10 171 U. S., 505.
it 175 U. S., 211.
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owner of a patent may assign it or sell the right to manufacture
and sell the article patented upon the condition that the assignee
shall charge a certain amount for such article."
Similarly, Justice Peckham held that the provision by which
the defendant agreed not to manufacture or sell any spring tooth
harrow manufactured under patents other than those which it had
assigned to the plaintiff or which the plaintiff licensed the defend-
ant to use, and the provision by which the plaintiff agreed not to
license any person other than this defendant to manufacture or
sell any harrow of the style then used or sold by this defendant,
were both proper and valid and in conformity with the Sherman
Act.
Alongside the discussion by the Supreme Court in Bement v.
National Harrow Company of the principles relating to patent
rights may be grouped three propositions laid down in three lines
of cases as follows:
First: The fact that the owner of a patent is a combination, or
a party to a combination, formed or existing for. the purpose of
monopolizing patents of the same general character, will not avail
an infringer. of such patent, who is not a licensee or party to such
combination, as a defense to a suit for infringement brought by
the owner of such patent. Similarly, the fact that the owner of a
patent is a combination, or a party to a combination, formed or
existing in violation of the Sherman Act, will not avail an
infringer of such patent, who is not a licensee or party to such
combination, as a defense to a suit for infringement brought by
the owner of such patent.'2
12 Strait v. National Harrow Company, 51 Fed., 819 (C. C. N. D., New
York, 1892.)
Edison Electric Light Co. v. Sawyer-Mann Electric Co., 53 Fed., 592
(C. C. A. 2nd C., 1892).
American Soda Fountain Co. v. Green, 69 Fed., 333 (C. C. E. D.,
Pennsylvania, 1895).
Bonsack Machine Co. v. Smith, 70 Fed., 383 (C. C. W. D., North Caro-
lina, 1895).
Columbia Wire Company v. Freeman Wire Company, 71 Fed., 302 (C.
C. E. D., Missouri, 1895).
Brown* Saddle Co. v. Troxel, 93 Fed., 620 (C. C. N. D., Ohio, 1899).
National Folding Box and Paper Co. vs. Robertson, 99 Fed., 985 (C.
C. D., Connecticut, 1900).
Lafayette Bridge Co. v. Streator, 105 Fed., 729 (C. C. N. D., Illinois,
1900).
Otis Elevator Co. v. Geiger, 107 Fed., 131 (C. C., Kentucky, 1901).
THE SHERMAN ACT AND PATENT LAW 439
Second: The owner of a patent may impose restrictions upon
the use of the patent and the manufacture and sale of the patented
articles by the licensee, and such restrictions, if part of an express
agreement between the owner and such licensee, may be enforced
by the owner against such licensee.
1 3
General Electric Co. v. Wise, 119 Fed., 922 (C. C. N. D., New York,
1903).
Fuller v. Berger, 120 Fed, 274 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1903); Certiorari
denied, 193 U. S., 668 (1904).
Cilley v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 152 Fed., 726 (C. C. D., Massa-
chusetts, 1907).
Jones-Pratt Co. v. Sachs Co., 176 Fed., 738 (C. C. D., Connecticut,
1910).
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Laemlle, 178 Fed., 104 (C. C. S. D.,
New York, 1910).
Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 179 Fed., 115 (C. C. A., 8th C.,
1910).
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Ullman, 186 Fed., 174 (C. C. S. D., New
York, 1910).
Contra:
National Harrow Co. v. Quick, 67 Fed., 130 (C. C. D., Indiana, 1895).
Affirmed, 74 Fed., 236 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1896).
Compare also:
National Harrow Co. v. Hench, 76 Fed., 667 (C. C. E. D., Pennsyl-
vania, 1896). Affirmed, 83 Fed., 36 (C. C. A., 3rd C., 1897).
13 Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O'Brien, 93 Fed., 200 (C. C. D., Massa-
chusetts, 1898).
U. S. Consolidated Seeded Raisin Co. v. Griffin & Skelley Co., 126
Fed., 364 (C. C. A., 9th C., 1903).
National Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128 Fed., 733 (C. C. A., 8th C.,
1904).
Rupp & Wittgenfeld Co. v. Elliott, 131 Fed., 730 (C. C. A., 6th C.,
1904).
Indiana Manufacturing Co. v. .J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 154
Fed., 365 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1907). Appeal dismissed, 207 U. S., 603
(1907).
Rubber Tire Vehicle Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 Fed.,
358 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1907).
Consolidated Rubber Tire Co. v. Diamond Rubber Co., 157 Fed., 677
(C. C. A., 2nd C., 1907).
Goshen Rubber Works v. Single Tube A. & B. Tire Co., 166 Fed., 431
(C. C. A., 7th C., 1908).
Fonotipia Limited v. Bradley, and Victor Talking Machine Co. v.
Bradley, 171 Fed., 951 (C. C. E. D., New York, 1909).
Indiana Mfg. Co. v. Nichols & Shepard Co., 190 Fed., 579 (C. C. E.
D., Michigan, 1911).
Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Standard Brewery, 174 Fed., 252 (C. C. N.
D., Illinois, 1909).
440 YALE LAW JOURNAL
Third: The owner of a patent may impose restrictions upon the
use and re-sale of the patented article by the party to whom such
article is sold, and such restrictions, if made known to such party,
may be enforced against such party by the owner of the patent,
even though no express agreement exists between them.1 4
See also:
National Phonograph Co. of Australia v. Menck, 104 L. T. Rep. 5,Privy Council, Feb. 3, 1911.
Incandescent Gas Light Co. v. Cantelo, 12 Pat. Cas., 262 (1895).Incandescent Gas Light Co. v. Brogden, 16 Pat. Cas., 179.British Mutoscope & Biograph Co., Limited, v. Homer, 84 L. T., 26(1901), 1 Ch., 671.
Badische Analin, etc., v. Isler, (1906), 1 Ch., 611.McGruther v. Pitcher, 91 L. T. Rep., 678 (1904), 2 Ch., 306.
Contra:
National Harrow Co. v. Hench, 76 Fed., 667 (C. C. E. D., Pennsyl-
vania, 1896). Affirmed, 83 Fed., 36 (C. C. A., 3rd C., 1897).Blount Manufacturing Co. v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., 166Fed., 555 (C. C. D., Mass., 1909).
14 Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., U. S. Supreme Court, March 11, 1912, (notyet reported).
Dickerson v. Matheson, 57 Fed., 524 (C. C. A., 2nd C., 1893).Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77Fed., 288 (C. C. A., 6th C., 1896).
Dickerson v. Tinling, 84 Fed., 192, (C. C. A., 8th C., 1897).Edison Phonograph Co. v. Kaufman, 105 Fed. 960 (C. C. W. D., Penn-
sylvania, 1901).
Cortelyon v. Lowe, 111 Fed., 1005 (C. C. A., 2nd C., 1901).Cortelyou v. Lowe, 114 Fed., 1021 (C. C. S. D., New York, 1902).Edison Phonograph Co. v. Pike, 116 Fed., 863 (C. C. D., Massachu-
setts, 1902).
Cortelyou v. Carters Ink Co., 118 Fed., 1022 (C. C. S. D., New York,
1902).
Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed., 424 (C. C. A., 7thC., 1903).
Brodrick Copygraph Co. of New Jersey v. Roper, 124 Fed., 1019 (C.C. D. R. I., 1903).
Brodrick Copyright Co. v. Mayhew, 131 Fed., 92 (C. C. E. D., Wis-
consin, 1902).
Mayhew v. Brodrick Copygraph Co. of New Jersey, 137 Fed., 596 (C.C. A., 7th C., 1905).
A. B. Dick Co. v. Henry, 149 Fed., 424 (C. C. S. D., New York, 1907).Aeolian Co. v. Juelg Co., 155 Fed., 119 (C. C. A., 2nd C.).New Jersey Patent Co. v. Schaeffer, 159 Fed., 171 (C. C. t. D., Penn-sylvania, 1908). Affirmed, 178 Fed., 276 (C. C. A., 3rd C., 1909). See alsoSame v. Same, 144 Fed., 437 (1906), and Same v. Weinburg, 183 Fed., 588both in C. C. E. D., Pennsylvania); Same v. Martin, 172 Fed., 760(C. C. N. D., Iowa, 1909).
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The discussion of the principles laid down in Bement v.
National Harrow Company can best be approached through a dis-
cussion of the three propositions last mentioned.
IlL.
First: The fact that the owner of a patent is a combination, or
a party to a combination, formed or existing for the -purpose of
monopolizing patents of the same general character, will not avail
an infringer of such patent, who is not a licensee or party to such
combination, as a defense to a suit for infringement brought by
the owner of such patent. Similarly, the fact that the owner of
a patent is a combination, or a party to a combination, formed or
existing in violation of the Sherman Act, will not avail an
infringer of such patent, who is not a licensee or party to such
combination, as a defense to a suit for infringement brought by
the owner of such patent.
Automatic Pencil Sharpener Co. v. Goldsmith Bros., 190 Fed., 205 (C.
C. S. D., New York, 1911).
Waltham Watch Co. v. Keene, 191 Fed., 855 (C. C. S. D., New York,
1911).
The Fair v. Dover Mfg. Co., 166 Fed., 117 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1908).
A. B. Dick Co. v. Milwaukee Office Specialty Co., 168 Fed., 930 (C. C.
E. D., Wisconsin, 1908).
Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Brooklyn Bottle Stopper Co., 172 Fed., 225
(C. C. E. D., New York, 1909).
Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Greenberger, 174 Fed., 252 (C. C, N. D.,
Illinois, 1909) ; Same v. Widrig, 190 Fed., 200.
Commercial Acetylene Co. v. Autolux Co., 181 Fed., 387 (C. C. E. D.,
Wisconsin, 1900).
Edison v. Ira M. Smith Mercantile Company, 188 Fed., 925 (C. C. W.
D., Michigan).
See also:
National Phonograph Co. of Australia v. Menck, 104 L. T. Rep., 5,
Privy Council, Feb. 3, 1911.
Incandescent Gas Light Co. of Cantele, 12 Pat. Cas., 262 (1895).
Incandescent Gas Light Co. v. Brogden, 16 Pat. Cas., 179.
British Mutoscope & Biograph Co., Limited, v. Homer, 84 L. T.
(1901), 1 Ch., 671.
Badische-Analin, etc., v. Isler (1906), 1 Ch., 611.
McGruther v. Pitcher, 91 L. T. Rep., 678 (1904), 2 Ch., 306.
But compare:
Cortelyou v. Johnson, 145 Fed., 933 (C. C. A., 2nd C., 1906). Affirmed,
207 U. S., 196 (1907).
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The first proposition rests upon the principle stated by Judge
Wallace in Strait v. National Harrow Company :15
"The party having such a patent has a right to bring suit on it,
not only against a manufacturer who infringes, but against dealers
and users of, the patented article, if he believes the patent is being
infringed; and the motive which prompts him to sue is not open to
judicial inquiry, because, having a legal right to sue, it is imma-
terial whether his motives are good or bad, and he is not required
to give his reasons for the attempt to assert his legal rights. * * ----
If the defendant had brought suit against the plaintiffs for some
breach of contract or violation of its alleged rights, founded upon
the combination agreement, then it might become pertinent to
inquire into the character of the combination, and ascertain
whether the court would enforce any rights growing out of it.
But in a suit brought for the infringement of a patent by the
owner, any such inquiry, at the behest of the infringer, would be
as impertinent as one in respect to the moral character or ante-
cedents of the plaintiff in an ordinary suit for trespass upon his
property."
The contrary view rests upon the grounds stated by Judge
Baker in National Harrow Co. v. Quick :8
"The common law forbids the organization of such combina-
tions, composed of numerous corporations and firms. They are
dangerous to the peace and good order of society, and they arro-
gate to themselves the exercise of powers destructive of the right
of free competition in the markets of the country, and, by their
aggregate power and influence, imperil the free and pure admin-
istration of justice. Strait v. Harrow Co. (sup.), 18 N. Y. Supp.,
224; Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich., 632, 43 N. W., 1102; Emery
v. Candle Co., 47 Ohio St., 320, 24 N. E., 66o; State v. Nebraska
Distilling Co., 24 Neb., 700, 46 N. W., 155.
"In suits at law it is doubtless true, as a general proposition,
that a wrongdoer will not be permitted to dispute the legal title
of one in possession of money or of property by showing that the
title thereto was unlawfully acquired, or that the owner intends
to apply it to an unlawful one. I have strong doubts whether this
rule ought to apply it to an unlawful use. I have strong doubts
whether this rule ought to apply to a suit in eqtiity, where nothing
but clean hands and a good conscience will move the court to act.
The combination represented by the complainant is not illegal in
any other sense, except that the law will not lend its aid to the
accomplishment of its purposes. The common law does not pro-
hibit the making of such combinations. It merely declines, after
15 51 Fed., 819, 820 (C. C. N. D., New York, 1892).
1 67 Fed., 130, 131-132 (C. C. D., Indiana, 1895).
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they have been made, to recognize their validity, by refusing to
make any decree or order which will in any way give aid to the
purposes of such combinations. It seems to me that the court
cannot sustain the present bill without giving aid to the unlawful
combination or trust represented by the complainant. The ques-
tion is not free from doubt, but in a case of doubt I felt it my duty
to resolve it in such a way as will not lend the countenance of the
court to the creation of combinations, trusts, or monopolies.' 7
Upon appeal in this case 8 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, reviewing the decision below, took pains to affirm
judgment upon grounds other than those quoted above from
Judge Baker's opinion, and added that
"while not prepared, in view of the authorities, to sanction the
proposition that the infringer of a patent may escape liability by
showing that the legal owner is engaged in a supposed unlawful
combination or trust, we do not consider the point."
Although the Supreme Court, in Bement v. National Harrow
Co. was careful to state that the Court could not assume upon the
record that "there was a general combination among the dealers
in patented harrows to regulate the sale and price of such har-
rows," there is much in that opinion, and also in the very recent
opinion of Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. (U. S. Supreme Court, March
II, 1912, not yet reported), to indicate that the Supreme Court
does not accept the doctrine laid down by Judge Baker.
In the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and in
several Circuit Courts, Judge Baker's doctrine has been expressly
repudiated, and the reasoning of Judge Wallace has been
adopted. 9
17 Compare:
National Harrow Co. v. Henck, 76 Fed., 667 (C. C. E. D., Pennsyl-
vania, 1896). Affirmed, 83 Fed., 36 (C. C. A., 3rd C., 1897).
18 National Harrow Company v. Quick, 74 Fed., 236 (C. C. A., 7th C.,
1896).
19 Columbia Wire Co. v. Freeman Wire Co., 71 Fed., 302, 306 (C. C. E.
D., Missouri, 1895).
National Folding Box & Paper Co. v. Robertson, 99 Fed., 985, 987 (C.
C. D., Connecticut, 1900).
Otis Elevator Co. v. Geiger, 107 Fed., 131, 133 (C. C. D., Kentucky,
1901).
General Electric Co. v. Wise, 119 Fed., 922, 924 (C. C. N. D., New
York, 1903).
Compare:
Edison Electric Light Co. v. Sawyer Man Electric Co., 53 Fed., 592,
598 (C. C. A., 2nd C., 1892).
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.Nothing in Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co."
is inconsistent with this first proposition. In that case, a number
of manufacturers, situated in different states and engaged in
manufacturing wall paper sold in different states, organized the
Continental Wall Paper Company as a selling company, through
which their entire output, in accordance with an agreement
between themselves, was sold to such persons only as entered
into a purchasing agreement by which their sales were restricted.
This combination was held to be illegal under the Sherman Act,
and a vendee of goods purchased from such illegal combination,
in pursuance of such illegal purchasing agreement, was allowed
to plead such illegality as a defense. The Court recognized that
a voluntary purchaser of goods at stipulated prices under a col-
lateral independent contract cannot avoid payment merely on the
ground that the vendor was an illegal combination (citing Con-
nolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.,21 and rested its decision entirely
on the point that, in the present case, recovery was sought upon
agreements "which had for their object, and which it is admitted
had directly the effect, to accomplish the illegal ends for which
the Continental Wall Paper Company was organized." The Court
thus accepted precisely the reasoning of Judge Wallace's opinion.
In another part of the opinion the Court quoted with approval
Bement v. National Harrow Company.
The first proposition above set forth is thus established by the
clear weight of authority.
IV.
Second: The owner of a patent may impose restrictions upon
the use of the patent and the manufacture and sale of the patented
article by the licensee, and such restrictions, if part of an express
agreement between the owner and such licensee, may be enforced
by the owner against such licensee.
This second proposition above set forth is illustrated in the
four following cases:
In United States Consolidated Seeded Raisin Company v.
Griffin & Skelley Company,22 the plaintiff sued for breach of an
agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant under which
20212 U. S., 227 (1909).
21184 U. S., 540.
22126 Fed., 364 (C. C. A., 9th C., 1903).
THE SHERMAN ACT AND PATENT LAW
the defendant, with other parties, assigned to the plaintiff certain
patents and the plaintiff granted licenses thereunder to the defend-
ant and to the other parties to the contract. The contract pro-
vided that the defendant and the other licensees should pay cer-
tain fixed royalties which should be divided among the owners
of all the patents in certain fixed proportions; that the plaintiff
should protect and keep up the patent monopoly and prosecute all
infringers; that the plaintiff should grant additional licenses under
the patent to such persons only as a committee selected by the
plaintiff and the licensees should name; that the licensees should
use and own the patented machines in strict compliance with speci-
fied conditions, and should use no other patented machines. The
Circuit Court instructed the jury to return a verdict for the
defendant on the ground that the contract was contrary to public
policy and tended to create a monopoly and violation of the anti-
trust law of California. judgment for the defendant was entered
on this verdict. The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, upon
the authority of Bement v. NAational Harrow Company and
Columbia Wire Company v. Freeman Wire Compqny 23 held that
the contract was not void for any of these reasons, and accord-
ingly reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court.
In Rubber Tire Vehicle Company v. Milwaukee Rubber Works
Company,24 the plaintiff sued to recover royalties on account of
the defendant's use of certain patents under license agreements
between the plaintiff as owner of a patent for rubber tired wheels
and the defendant and other licensees. These license agreements
established uniform prices and fixed the percentage of output
which could be made and sold by each licensee and provided that
commissioners employed by the plaintiff should supervise the
business of all licensees and receive a specified proportion of the
royalties and distribute such fund among the licensees according
to their quota of trade or use such fund with the consent of the
majority to purchase tires from any or all of the licensees and
sell the same to the trade at such prices as they should deem for
the best interest of all. The Circuit Court directed judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
this judgment. Judge Baker, writing the opinion of the Court,
stated that the question could not be disposed of upon the author-
23 71 Fed., 302, C. C. E. D., Missouri, 1895.
24154 Fed., 358 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1907).
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ity of Bement v. National Harrow Company, but that "aided by
the declarations of general principles in that and other cases we
must formulate our own answer." He then continued:
"Under its constitutional right to regulate interstate commerce
Congress made illegal 'every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several states,' and subjected to liability to fine
or imprisonment 'every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several states.' Congress, having created the patent law,
had the right to repeal or modify it, in whole or in part, directly
or by necessary implication. The Sherman law contains no
reference to the patent law. Each was passed under a separate and
distinct constitutional grant of power. Each was passed pro-
fessedly to advantage the public. The necessary implication is that
not one iota was taken away from the patent law; the necessary
implication is that patented articles, unless or until they are
released by the owner of the patent from the dominion of his
monopoly are not articles of trade or commerce among the several
states. The evils to be remedied by the Sherman law are well
understood. Articles in which the people are entitled to freedom
of trade were being taken as the subjects of monopoly; instru-
mentalities of commerce between which the people are entitled to
free competition were being combined. The means of effecting
and the form of the combination are immaterial; the result is the
criterion. The true test of violation of the Sherman law is
whether the people are injured, whether they are deprived of
something to which they have a right. Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, 193 U. S., 197, 24 Sup. Ct., 436, 48 L. Ed., 679.
"Grant (plaintiff's assignor of the patent on which plaintiff was
suing) produced a new integer in the useful arts. See Consoli-
dated Rubber Tire Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (C. C. A.
Second Circuit, Jan. 30, 1907, Feb. I, 1907), 151 Fed., 237. Plain-
tiff, as his successor in interest, is the owner of a valid patent.
That stands as an unquestionable fact on this writ of error. The
only grant to the patentee was the right to exclude others, to have
and to hold for himself and his assigns a monopoly, not a right
limited or conditioned according to the sentiment of judges, but
an absolute monopoly constitutionally conferred by the sovereign
lawmakers. Over and above an absolute monopoly created by
law, how can there be a further and an unlawful monopoly in
the same thing? If plaintiff were the sole maker of Grant tires,
how could plaintiff's control of prices and output injure the people,
deprive them of something to which they have a right? Is a
greater injury or deprivation inflicted, if plaintiff authorizes a
combination or pool to do what plaintiff can do directly? To say
"yes" means that substance is disregarded, that mere words confer
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upon the people some sort of a right or interest counter to the
monopoly, when by the terms of the bargain the people agreed
to claim none until Grant's deed to them shall have matured. * * *
"None of the provisions of the contract, in our judgment,
touched any matter outside of the monopoly under the patent.
The control of prices and output, for reasons already stated, did
not deprive the public of any right. Both before and after the
period covered by the contract the market was demoralized,
prices were cut, and the owner of the patent was getting nothing
except by the slow and expensive process of litigation; but the
public was not entitled to profit by competition among infringers.
The interval agreements relating to royalties, proportioning the
business, supervision, and penalties did not affect or concern the
public at all."
In Indiana Manufacturing Co. v. . I. Case Threshing Machine
Co.,25 the plaintiff sued for an accounting and for an injunction
restraining the defendant from making, using or selling stackers
except in compliance with the terms of the license which the plain-
tiff had previously granted to all its licensees, including defendant.
By the terms of the license agreements, the defendant and other
licensees were required to maintain a fixed price, put on patent
marks, and pay the plaintiff a fixed royalty, and the plaintiff gave
the defendant and the other licensees the benefit of any more
favorable terms extended to subsequent licensees. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant was manufacturing stackers which
infringed upon the plaintiff's patents and that the defendant
declined to comply with the terms of the license agreement in
respect to the stackers so manufactured. Among other defenses,
the defendant urged that the license agreement violated the Sher-
man Act. The Circuit Court dismissed the bill. In reversing
the decree of the Circuit Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was not violated, and added that
"if, as a condition of enjoying the inventions, appellant had
required the licensees to form a pool or combination for con-
trolling the price and output of the patented article, the public
would not have been injured, and consequently the Sherman law
would not have been violated."
In Goshen Rubber Works v. Single Tube A. & B. Tire Coin-
pany 26 a patentee sued a licensee to recover the royalties agreed
upon for the use of the invention. By the license agreement, the
sales of tires made by each licensee were supervised by a com-
25 154 Fed., 365 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1907).
26166 Fed., 431 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1908).
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missioner appointed under the agreement, and each licensee paid
to the commissioner a ratable amount in proportion to the quota
of output allotted to such licensee and an additional royalty on any
amount exceeding such quota and paid a forfeit in case he sold
any tires at less than the prices specified by its agreement. In
affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the license agreement was not in violation of the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act and said:
"The only right secured to the public by the licenses was to
purchase tires after they had been manufactured and offered for
sale. It did not obtain the right to have the competition toward
the different licensees continued or in any way obtain the embargo
against the modification of the licenses."
In opposition to the authorities above cited are several cases
which are often advanced in support of the view that this second
proposition does not obtain when the owner of the patent is a com-
bination, or a party to a combination, formed or existing for the
purpose of monopolizing or preventing competition among patents
of the same general character.
The case most frequently cited as authority for this alleged
modification of the second proposition above mentioned is
National Harrow Company v. Hench17 in which the Court said:
"The fact that the property involved is covered by letters patent
is urged as a justification; but we do not see how any importance
can be attributed to this fact. Patents confer a monopoly as
respects the property covered by them, but they confer no right
upon the owners of several distinct patents to combine for the
purpose of restraining competition and trade. Patented property
does not differ in this respect from any other. The fact that one
patentee may possess himself of several patents, and thus increase
his monopoly, affords no support for an argument in favor of a
combination by several distinct owners of such property to
restrain manufacture, control sales and enhance prices. Such
combinations are conspiracies against the public interest, and
abuses of patent privileges. The object of these privileges is to
promote the public benefit, as well as to reward inventors. The
suggestion that the contract is justified by the situation of the
parties-their exposure to litigation-is entitled to no greater
weight. Patentees may compose their differences, as the owners
of other property may, but they cannot make the occasion an
excuse or cloak for the creation of monopolies to the public dis-
advantage."
2783 Fed., 36 (C. C. A., 3rd C., 1897).
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While this precise point was not passed upon by the Supreme
Court in Bement v. National Harrow Company five years later,
the breadth of language in which the Supreme Court laid down
the principles governing that case and the eloquent omission of the
Supreme Court to approve or even mention National Harrow Co.
v. Hench-notwithstanding that the facts of that case closely
resembled the facts in Bement v. National Harrow Co.-are very
significant circumstances. The recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. (not yet reported), is incon-
sistent with proposition laid down in National Harrow Company
v. Hench.
The proposition stated in National Harrow Co. v. Hench was
apparently approved by Judge Brown in Blount Manufacturing
Co. v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co. 28  There the question
was raised on a demurrer to a bill for an accounting in accordance
with the terms of certain contracts which were construed to
restrain competition between the parties, to prevent the parties
from furnishing to the public new styles of liquid door checks,
patented or unpatented, anywhere in the United States, and to
apportion among the parties the profits arising from the manu-
facture and sale of checks, patented and unpatented, anywhere in
the United States. The pleadings and argument of counsel show
that the only question raised was whether the contracts covered
unpatented as well as patented checks; and that it was never
seriously questioned that if the contracts covered unpatented as
well as patented checks the contracts were in violation of the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act. Having interpreted the contracts to cover
unpatented as well as patented checks, the Court necessarily sus-
tained the demurrer to the bill. The actual decision, therefore,
is in no way authority for any modification of the second proposi-
tion above mentioned. The doctrine laid down in National Har-
row Co. v. Hench was not at all involved. So much of Judge
Brown's opinion as seems to take issue with the second proposi-
tion above mentioned is not only inconsistent with the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. (not
28 166 Fed., 555 (C. C. D., Massachusetts, 1909). Misapprehension
concerning the exact issue involved in this case has led to considerale mis-
interpretation of Judge Brown's opinion and to its misapplication-notably
in Gladney: Restraints of Trade in Patented Articles-in support of
propositions which, it is submitted, are fundamentally inconsistent with
well settled principles of patent law.
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yet reported), and at variance with the overwhelming weight of
authority but it is, at best, only dictum in the case.
V.
Third: The owner of a patent may impose restrictions upon the
use and re-sale of the patented article by the party to whom such
article is sold, and such restrictions, if made known to such party,
may be enforced against such party by the owner of the patent,
even though no express agreement exists between them.
The leading case for the third proposition above set forth-
until the very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Henry v.
A. B. Dick Co. (not yet reported), announced March II, 1912,
while this article was in press, but which will be discussed in a
subsequent article-is Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v.
Eureka Specialty Co. 2  This was an appeal from the decree of
the lower Court sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff's bill.
Plaintiff owned several patents relating to the art of fastening
buttons to shoes with metallic fasteners and the machines embody-
ing these patents were in general use in the shoe trade and "wholly
superseded every other mode of fastening buttons to shoes." All
machines sold by the plaintiff bore a conspicuous metal plate on
which was plainly expressed a restriction to the effect that the
machine was sold and purchased to use only with fasteners made
by the plaintiff and that title should revert upon any violation of
this restriction. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, with full
knowledge of these facts, made and sold staples adapted only for
use in such machines for the purpose of inducing the users of
such machines to violate such restrictions. In reversing the decree,
the Court, (Judges Taft, Lurton and Hammond, Judge Lurton
writing the opinion of the Court) unanimously held that the fact
that the plaintiff
"sells the machine through jobbers and not directly to those who
buy for use, is immaterial, under the facts stated on the face of
the bill. The jobber buys and sells subject to the restriction and
both have notice of the conditional character of the sale and of
the restriction on the use."
The Court traced the derivation of this rule to the inherent
nature of the patent right:
29 77 Fed., 288 (C. C. A., 6th C., 1892).
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"A use prohibited by the license is a use in defiance of the
monopoly reserved by the patentee and necessarily an unlawful
infringement of the rights secured to him by his patent. * * * The
patentee has the exclusive right of use, except in so far as he has
parted with it by his license. The essence of the monopoly con-
ferred by the grant of letters patent is the exclusive right to use
the invention or discovery described in the patent. This exclusive
right of use is a true and absolute monopoly, and is granted in
derogation of the common right, and this right to monopolize the
use of the invention or discovery is the substantial property right
conferred by law, and which the public is under obligation to
respect and protect. 'The right to make and use, or sell, is
completely severable rights, and involves the right to confer on
others such qualified privilege, whether of making, of selling to
others, or of using, as he sees fit, whether within specified limits,
or under limitations of quantity or numbers or restricted use.'
Dorsey Revolving Harvester Rake Co. v. Bradley Manufacturinq
Co., 12 Blatchf., 202, Fed. Cas. No. 4,015. In Adams v. Burke,
17 Wall., 453-456, the Court said, 'The right to manufacture, the
right to sell, and the right to use, are each substantive rights, and
may be granted separately or conferred together by the patentee."
The Court then took up the objection that the rule which it had
laid down might give the patentee a "practical monopoly of the
market" for an unpatentable product made with the patented
device. The Court disposed of this objection by showing that
such "practical monopoly," far from offending public policy,
actually promotes the general welfare, because the patentees can
attain it only by "cheapening the cost of manufacture," and can
continue it only "so long as their invention was not superseded by
subsequent inventions still further cheapening the cost of manu-
facture." So cogent is the reasoning of the Court that it deserves
careful attention:
"If the patentee choose to reserve to himself the exclusive use
of his device, and the invention be of a wide character, and so
radical as to enable him to make and sell an unpatentable product
cheaper than any other competitor, a practical monopoly of the
market for that article will result; and yet no one could say that
a monopoly thus secured was illegitimate, or obnoxious to public
policy.
"To illustrate: Let it be supposed that the patents owned by
this complainant were of so wide a character as to cheapen the
process of manufacturing shoes, and to drive from competition
all other mode of manufacture. Then suppose the patentees
were of opinion that they could most profitably enjoy their inven-
tions by retaining the monopoly of the use, and engaging in the
manufacture of shoes. If content to undersell all others, they
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could engross the market for shoes, to the extent of their capacity
to supply the demand during the life of their patents, or so long
as their, invention was not superseded by subsequent inventions
still further cheapening the cost of manufacture. The monopoly
thus secured would be the legitimate consequence of the meritor-
ious character of their invention. Yet just such monopolies may
result whenever a new and surprising advance is made in some art
of wide and general use. The great consuming public would be
benefited, rather than injured, for the monopoly could endure so
long only as shoes were supplied at a less price than had pre-
vailed before the invention.
"Now, if the patentees, by retaining to themselves the exclusive
use of their invention, are able, legitimately and lawfully, to
acquire a monopoly of the manufacture of shoes, and destroy the
shoe market for those who before had shared it, why may they
not, by a system of restricted licenses, permit others to use their
devices on condition that only some minor part of the shoe,--the
pegs, the tips, the thread or the buttons, or the button fasteners,-
shall be bought from them? If these concessions were such as to
enable others to compete though their use of the mechanism was
restricted by the terms of the license, who could justly complain,
if the inventors, content with a monopoly of the market for the
article named in their license, surrendered the opportunity for a
monopoly of the manufacture of the complete shoe ?"
In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Henry v. A. B.
Dick Co. (not yet reported), the Court stated this economic argu-
ment still more succinctly:
"The public is always free to take or refuse the patented article
on the terms imposed. If they be too onerous or not in keeping
with the benefits, the patented article will not find a market. The
public, by permitting the invention to go unused, loses nothing
which it had before, and when the patent expires will be free to
use the invention without compensation or restriction."
Returning to the facts before it the Court, in Heaton-Penin-
sular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., continued:
"The inventions covered by complainant's patents are not of
such character as to enable them, by retaining the exclusive use,
to absorb either the making of shoes, or the minor work of
fastening buttons to shoes. In the exercise of the right of
exclusive use, they have put on the market a structure embodying
their devices, and licensed the purchaser to use the invention 'only
with staples' made by themselves. In other words, they have
chosen to fix the price for the right of use at the profit resulting
from the sale of staples. As observed by counsel for complain-
ant, 'The fasteners are thus made the counters by which the
royalty proportioned to the actual use of the machine is deter-
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mined.' This method of licensing their mechanism may or may
not result in the engrossment of the market for staples. So long
as their invention -controls the market for button-fastening
appliances, and to the extent that their machines shall supersede
other modes of clinching staples, just so long will they be enabled
to control the market for staples. Their monopoly in an unpat-
ented article will depend upon the merit of their patented device,
and the extent to which other clinching devices are superseded
by it."
The common sense underlying this rule was well expressed
in the comment of another justice :30
'The owner might stipulate for a price or royalty to be received
entirely in a stated sum of money or in part in the profits that he
would make in furnishing fasteners at an agreed price for use in
the machine. The purchaser who could not obtain the machine
at all except upon such terms as the owner should choose to
impose might as well agree to pay for it in that way as in any
other."
An English judge has stated the same principle in even homelier
language :"'
"The patentee has the sole right of using and selling the articles
and he may prevent anybody from dealing with them at all.
Inasmuch as he has the right to prevent people from using them
or dealing in them at all, he has the right to the lesser thing, that
is to say, to impose his own conditions. It does not matter how
unreasonable or how absurd the conditions are. It does not
matter what they are, if he says at the time when the purchaser
proposes to buy or the person to take a license: 'Mind I only give
you this license on this condition,' and the purchaser is free to
take it or leave it as he likes. If he takes it he must be bound by
the condition. It seems to be common sense and not to depend
upon any patent law or any other particular law."
The economic and legal foundation on which the Court built
the logic of its great decision in Heaton-Peninsular Button Fas-
tener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co. was succinctly defined by the
Court itself in these few words:
30 Opinion of the Justices, 193 Mass., 605, 614-615 (1907), opinion of
Morton, C. J., and Knowlton, 3.
31 Incandescent Gas Light Co., Limited v. Cantello, 12 Pat. Cas., 262
(1895), approved and followed in National Phonograph Company of Aus-
tralia v. Menck, 104 L. T. Rep., 5, Privy Council (Feb. 3, 1911), Incan-
descent Gas Light Co. v. Brogden, 16 Pat. Cas., 179; British Mutoscope &
Biograph Co., Limited v. Homer, 84 L. T. Rep., 261 (1901), 1 Ch., 671, and
McGrnther v. Pitcher, 91 L. T. Rep., 678 (1904), 2 Ch., 306.
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"The monopoly in the unpatented staple results as an incident
from the monopoly in the use of complainant's invention, and is
therefore a legitimate result of the patentee's control over the
use of his invention by others. Depending, as such a monopoly
would, upon the merits of the invention to which it is a mere inci-
dent, it is neither obnoxious to public policy, nor an illegal
restraint of trade. 32
This masterly decision in which Judge Taft, now President of
the United States, and Judge Lurton, now an associate justice of
the Supreme Court, both participated and concurred, is the foun-
dation of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Henry v.
A. B. Dick Co. (not yet reported), and has repeatedly been cited
with approval by the Federal Courts of other circuits and by the
Supreme Court.33
Cortelyou v. Johnson3 4 is sometimes cited as expressing an
apparent modification of the third proposition above set forth.
There the defendant was charged with contributory infringement
of the plaintiff's patent. The plaintiff manufactured and sold a
patented rotary mimeograph which bore a notice to the effect that
the machine was sold "with the license restriction that it can be
32 For an equally well-reasoned discussion of principles, as well as a
review and an endorsement of the English decision which have applied the
same rule, see National Phonograph Co. of Australia v. Menck, 104 L. T.
Rep., 5, Privy Council, (Feb. 3, 1911).
3 See:
Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S., 70, 90 (1902).
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S., 339, 345 (1908).
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S., 405,
425 (1908).
Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., U. S. Supreme Court, March 11, 1912 (not
yet reported.
Cortelyou v. Lowe, 111 Fed., 1005 (C. C. A. 2nd C., 1901).
Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. v. Jackson, 112 Fed., 146, 148.(C. C. A.,
1st C.)
Fuller v. Berger, 120 Fed., 274, 277 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1903).
Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed., 424 (C. C. A., 7th
C., 1903).
National Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128 Fed., 733, 735 (C. C. A., 8th
C., 1904).
James Heekin Co. v. Baker, 138 Fed., 63, 66 (C. C. A., 8th C., 1905).
Indiana Manufacturing Co. v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 154
Fed., 365, 367 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1907).
St. Louis Flushing Machine Co. v. Sanitary Street Flushing Machine
Co., 178 Fed., 923, 927 (C. C. A., 9th C., 1910).
34 145 Fed., 933 (C. C. A., 2nd C., 1906).
THE SHERMAN ACT AND PATENT LAW
used only with stencil paper, ink and other supplies made by the
Neostyle Company." The Court dismissed the bill on the ground
that the defendant had not sufficient notice of this restriction.
The Court then expressed its acceptance of the rule laid down in
Heaton-Peninsula Button Fastener Company v. Eureka Specialty
Company and considered its decisions in Cortelyou v. Lowe,3'
Cortelyou v. Carter's Ink Company,36 Brodrick Copygraph Com-
pany of New Jersey v. Mayhew37 and Mayhew v. Brodrick Copy-
graph Company.8  The Court (Judge Townsend strongly dis-
senting) then said:
"When confined to articles, whether covered by the patent or
not, which are made for the express purpose of inducing infringe-
ment and are not intended for any legitimate use, the doctrine of
contributory infringement is logical, just and salutary. But we
doubt the wisdom of extending it to the ordinary commodities of
life, used in connection with a patented machine, because the
patentee sells or licenses the machine upon the condition that he
alone is to furnish these commodities. Care should be taken that
the courts, in their efforts to protect the rights of patentees, do
not invade the just rights of others engaged in legitimate occupa-
tions, by creating new monopolies not covered by patents and by
placing unwarrantable restrictions upon trade. We think it is
clear that the doctrine may be carried far enough to produce such
results. For instance, should the patentee of a fountain pen by
such a notice as we have under consideration, be permitted to hold
as an infringer one who sells ink to the owner of the pen even
though he knows of the restriction? To compel the dealer to
make inquiries and take the precautions necessary to save himself
from being sued as an infringer would place intolerable burdens
upon business. Should the patentee of a motor car, by such
proceedings, be able to hold the monopoly on all gasoline used in
its propulsion, or the patentee of a stove or a refrigerator have an
action of infringement against one who furnishes ice or coal,
respectively to its owner? These may seem to be extreme cases
and yet they are not so far beside the mark as may at first appear.
It was stated at the Bar that among the 'supplies' necessary for
the operation of neostyle were oil and varnish. It is not easy to
perceive how a machinist lubricates the machine and the painter'
who varnishes it can escape the charge of infringement. If the
doctrine be driven to its ultimate conclusion the merchant and the
consumer may find themselves enmeshed in a network of monopo-
lies embracing all the necessaries of life. No one may safely sell
3' 11 Fed., 1005 (C. C. A., 2nd C., 1901).
36 118 Fed., 1022 (C. C. S. D., New York, 1902).
37 131 Fed., 92 (C. C. E. D., Wisconsin, 1902).
38 137 Fed., 696 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1905).
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coffee to the consumer but the patentee of his coffee mill, no one
can furnish him flour but the patentee of his baking pans and he
may yet be compelled to buy milk from the patentee of his milk-
can and soap from the patentee of his bath-tub. It is manifest
that the doctrine may be expanded ad infinitum. We incline to
the opinion that the line should be drawn to improve these articles
which are either parts of a patented combination or a device or
which are produced for the sole purpose of being so used and to
exclude the staple articles of commerce.
"For these reasons we think that the complainants should be
confined strictly to existing law and that the doctrine should not
be expanded so as to brand as a wrong-doer one who, having no
arrangement express or implied with the patentee, sells to the
public commodities needed in the ordinary affairs of life."
Upon appeal,39 the Supreme Court affirmed the decision on the
ground that the defendant had not sufficient notice of the restric-
tion, and said:
"While in Bement v. National Harrow Company, 186 U. S., 70,
this Court held, in respect to patent rights, that with few excep-
tions 'any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal
with regard to this kind of property, imposed by the patentee and
agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or
sell the article, will be upheld by the courts,' it is unnecessary to
consider how far a stipulation in a contract between the owner of
a patent right and the purchaser from him of a machine manu-
factured under that right, that it should be used only in a certain
way, will sustain an action in favor of the vendor against the pur-
chaser in case of a breach of that stipulation."
In the very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Henry v.
A. B. Dick Company-announced March 1I, 1912, while this
article was in press, and not yet reported, but which will be dis-
cussed in a subsequent article-the Court expressly held (Chief
Justice White, and Justices Hughes and Lamar dissenting) that
the defendant Henry committed contributory infringement of the
complainant company's patents covering the mimeograph above
mentioned, when he sold to one who had purchased from the com-
plainant a mimeograph bearing the notice of a license restriction
similar to that above quoted, some unpatented ink "suitable for
use upon said mimeograph, with knowledge of the said license
agreement, and with the expectation that it would be used in con-
nection with said mimeograph."
In this state of the decisions, it must be said that the third
proposition above set forth is supported by the overwhelming
39 Cortelyou v. Johnson, 207 U. S., 196, 1907.
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weight of authority. Even if the modification suggested in the
single case of Cortelyou v. JohnsoiO0 and negatived by the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. (not
yet reported), should ever, in the future, become established,
it will be noted that it merely saves from contributory infringe-
ment suits parties who furnish general articles of commerce to
users of patented articles.
Several lines of cases, frequently cited as standing for a modi-
fication of the third proposition above set forth, may readily be
distinguished.
41
In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus42 the plaintiff sued to restrain
the defendants from selling at retail for less than one dollar a
copyrighted novel published by the plaintiff. No contract existed
between the parties, but in the novel the plaintiff printed a notice
stating that the retail price is $i.oo and that "no dealer is licensed
to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as
an infringement of the copyright." Justice Day, giving the opin-
ion of the Court, affirmed the decree dismissing the bill, and stated
(343) that "a case such as the present one, concerning inventions
protected by letters patent of the United States, has not been
decided in this Court, so far as we are able to discover." In this
connection he took pains to distinguish the cases of Cotton Tie
Company v. Simmons,4 3 Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper
Co.,44 Bement v. National Harrow Co., and Cortelyou v. John-
son.4 5 Justice Day then continued:
"If we were to follow the course taken in the argument, and
discuss the rights of a patentee under letters patent, and then, by
40 145 Fed., 933.
41 Copyright cases:
Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Straus, 210 U. S., 339 (1908).
Mines v. Scribner, 147 Fed., 927 (C. C. S. D., New York, 1906).
Proprietary medicine cases:
Jayne v. Loder, 149 Fed., 21 (C. C. A., 3rd C., 1906).
John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed., 24 (C. C. A., 6th C.,
1907). Appeal dismissed, 212 U. S., 588, 1908.
Dr. Miles Medical Company v. Jaynes Drug Company, 149 Fed., 838
(C. C. D., Massachusetts, 1906).
Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Parks & Sons Company, 220
U. S., 373 (1911). 1
42210 U. S., 339 (1908).
43 106 U. S., 89.
4 152 U. S., 425.
45207 U. S., 196.
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analogy, apply the conclusions to copyrights, we might greatly
embarrass the consideration of a case under letters patent, when
one of that character shall be presented to this Court.
"We may say in passing, disclaiming any intention to indicate
our views as to what would be the rights of parties in circum-
stances similar to the present case under the patent laws, that there
are differences between the patent and copyright statutes in the
extent of the protection granted by them. This was recognized
by Judge Lurton, who wrote a leading case on the subject in the
Federal courts (The Button Fastener Case, 77 Fed. Rep., 288),
for he said in the subsequent case of Park & Sons v. Hartman,
153 Fed. Rep., :24:
"'There are such wide differences between the right of multi-
plying and vending copies of a production protected by the copy-
right statute and the rights secured to an inventor under the patent
statutes, that the cases which relate to the one subject are not
altogether controlling as to the other."'
Justice Day then approached the consideration of the question
"'as a new one in this Court," and concluded:
"In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner
of the copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production,
do not create the right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed
in this case, a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail
by future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract.
* * * To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control
all future retail sales, by a notice that such sales must be made at
a fixed sum, would give a right not included in the terms of the
statute, and, in our view, extend its operation, by construction,
beyond its meaning, when interpreted with a view to ascertaining
the legislative intent in its enactment."
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.,46 the plaintiff
manufactured and sold proprietary medicines to such jobbers only
as agreed with the plaintiff to maintain certain fixed prices for all
sales by all wholesale and retail dealers, whether purchasers or
sub-purchasers. The defendant refused to enter into this agree-
ment, and obtained some of the plaintiff's products and advertised
and sold them at less than the fixed price provided in this agree-
ment. The plaintiff prayed for an injunction restraining the
defendant from such conduct and asked for an accounting. The
plaintiff argued that the restrictions in its system of contracts
were valid because they related to proprietary medicines manu-
factured under a secret process, and because, apart from this, a
manufacturer is entitled to control the price in all sales of his own
46220 U. S., 373 (1911).
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product. In support of this contention, the plaintiff urged an
analogy of rights secured by letters patent, and cited portions of
the opinion in Bement v. National Harrow Company. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decree dismissing the bill. Justice
Hughes, writing the opinion of the Court, held that the case pre-
sented no analogy to letters patent. The case, he said,
"lies outside the policy of the patent law, and the extent of the
right which that law secures is not here involved or deter-
mined. * * * The questions concern not the process of manufac-
ture, but the manufactured product, an article of commerce. * * *
Because there is monopoly of production, it certainly cannot be
said that there is no public interest in maintaining freedom of
trade with respect to future sales after the article has been placed
on the market and the producer has parted with his title. * * * But
because a manufacturer is not bound to make or sell, it does not
follow that in case of sales actually made he may impose upon
purchasers every sort of restriction. - * * Nor can the manufac-
turer by rule and notice, in the absence of contract or statutory
right, even though the restriction be known to purchasers, fix
prices for future sales. * * * Whatever right the manufacturer
may have to project his control beyond his own sales must depend,
not upon the inherent power incidental to protection and original
ownership, but upon agreement. * * * The present case is not
analogous to that of a sale of good will, or of an interest in a
business, or of the grant of a right to use a process of manufac-
ture. .* * The agreements are designed to maintain prices, after
the complainant has parted with the title to the articles and to
prevent competition among those who trade in them. * * * If there
be an advantage to a manufacturer in the maintenance of fixed
retail prices, the question remains whether it is one which he is
entitled to secure by agreements restricting the freedom of trade
on the part of dealers who own what they sell. * * * No distinc-
tion can properly be made by reason of the particular character of
the commodity in question. It is not entitled to special privilege
or immunity. It is an article of commerce and the rules con-
cerning the freedom of trade must be held to apply to it. Nor
does the fact that the margin of freedom is reduced by the con-
trol of production make the protection of what remains, in such a
case, a negligible matter. And where commodities have passed
into the channels of trade and are owned by dealers, the validity
of agreements to prevent competition and to maintain prices is not
to be determined by the circumstance whether they were produced
by several manufacturers or by one, or whether they were pre-
viously owned by one or by many. The complainant having sold
its product at prices satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to
whatever advantage may be derived from competition in the sub-
sequent traffic."
YALE LAW JOURNAL
In both of the cases last quoted, and in the groups of cases of
which they are representative, and particularly in its very recent
decision in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. (not yet reported), the Court
was careful to state that the facts of these cases presented no
analogy to cases relating to patented articles. The distinction
between the copyright cases and the proprietary medicine cases,
on the one hand, and cases involving the patent rights, on the
other hand, was expressed by Judge Lurton (now an associate
justice of the Supreme Court) in the opinion of the Court in
John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman,4 7 and the inapplicability
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to contracts regarding the use and
price of patented articles was emphatically stated as follows:
"That articles made under patents may be the subject of con-
tracts by which their use and price in sub-sales may be controlled
by the patentee, and that such contracts, if otherwise valid, are not
within the terms of the act of Congress against restraints of inter-
state commerce or the rules of the common law against monopolies
and restraints of trade, is now well settled. Heaton-Penzinsular
Button Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed., 288, 25 C. C. A., 267,
35 L. R. A., 728; Dickerson v. Tinling, 84 Fed., 192, 28 C. C. A.,
139; Edison Phonograph Co. v. Kaufman (C. C.), 105 Fed., 960;
Edison Phonograph Co. v Pike (C. C.), 116 Fed., 863; Rupp et al.
v. Elliott, 131 Fed., 73 o , 65 C. C. A., 544; Victor Talking Machine
Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed., 428, 61 C. C. A., 58; Bement v. National
Barrow Co., 186 U. S., 70, 22 Sup. Ct., 747, 46 L. Ed., 1O58.
"The patent grants an exclusive right to use, to make, and to
sell. . The patentee may grant, if he will, an unrestricted right
to make and sell or use the device embodying his invention, or
may grant only a restricted right in either the field of making,
using or selling. To the extent that he restricts either one of these
separable rights, the article is not released from the domain of the
patent, and any one who violates the restrictions imposed by the
patentee, with notice, is an infringer.
"This is the ground upon which the cases stand which upheld
restrictions upon either use or sale of a patented article where
infringement is alleged. But, when a patentee imposes such
restrictions, they may likewise constitute a contract between the
patentee and his direct vendee or licensee. In such case the
patentee would have a double remedy-an action in tort for
infringement or an action for the breach of the contract. The
double remedy in such circumstances is noticed in Heaton-Penin-
sular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed., 288,
25 C. C. A., 267, 35 L. R. A., 728, and in Victor Talking Machine
Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed., 424, 61 C. C. A., 58. In Bement v.
National Harrow Co., 186 U. S, 70, 22 Sup. Ct., 747, 46 L. Ed.,
47153 Fed., 24 (C. C. A., 6th C., 1907), 27-28.
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1058, the action was one for breach of a contract by which thepatentee had suffered his invention to be used on condition that
the articles embodying it should not be sold below a certain price.
In National Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128 Fed., 733, 64 C. C.A., 594, the bill was not to restrain infringement, but to enjoin
sales by a vendee who was a jobber and who by direct contracthad purchased phonographs made under the patent, agreeing to
sell only at a named price -and only to retailers who signed an
agreement regulating retail sales. Whether a remedy is sought
for the violation of restrictions placed by a patentee, upon either
the use or the sale of an article made under the patent, is in tort
or in contract, the rules of the common law in respect of monopo-lies and restraints of trade have no application, because the very
object of the patent law is to give to the patentee an exclusive
monopoly in using, making, and selling, the device which embodies
the invention, and this exclusive right he may exercise by con-
tracts under which he reserves to himself so much of his exclu-
sive right as he does not elect to sell or assign or license.
"It follows therefore, that contracts restraining subsequent sales
or use of a patented article which would contravene the common-
law rules against monopolies and restraints of trade, if made in
respect of unpatented articles, are valid because of the monopoly
granted by the patent. Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186
U. S., 70, 91, 93, 22 Sup. Ct., 747, 46 L. Ed., lO58; Edison Phono-graph Co. v. Kaufman (C. C.), 105 Fed., 960; Edison Phonograph
Co. v. Pike (C. C.), 116 Fed., 863; Victor Talking Machine Co. v.
The Fair, 123 Fed., 424, 61 C. C. A., 58. In the Bement Case,
cited above, the action was at law to recover liquidated damagesfor the breach of a contract in respect of the price at which arti-
cles made under a patent should be sold. The Court, among other
things said:
"'The very object of these laws is monopoly, and the rule is,
with very few exceptions, that any conditions which are not in
their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of property,imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right
to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the
courts. The fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up the
monopoly or fix prices does not render them illegal."'
The same rule was laid down with equal emphasis by the
Supreme Court in its recent decision in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.
(not yet reported).
Even if the principle of the copyright and proprietary medicine
cases above mentioned were applied to patented articles-in con-
tradiction of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Henry
v. A. B. Dick Co. (not yet reported),, it seems that at most it
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could go no further than the modification apparently expressed
above by the Court in Cortelyou v. Johnson.48
Nothing in the recent case of United States v. Standard Sani-
tary Manufacturing Company49 in any way disagrees with the
second and third propositions of law above set forth. There the
owner of a patent, covering a tool used in manufacturing non-
patented articles, made agreements with all the manufacturers of
such non-patented articles, by which he licensed such manufac-
turer to use the patented tool in the process of manufacturing such
unpatented articles, and fixed the terms and prices under which
such manufacturer should sell such unpatented articles to jobbers
and wholesalers, and fixed the terms and prices under which the
jobbers and wholesalers should sell the unpatented articles to the
retailers. Such agreements were held to be in violation of the
Sherman Act. The agreements, it will be noted, related primarily
to the manufacture and sale of articles which in no way were
covered by the patent in question. The decision in that case,
therefore, has no bearing upon the second and third propositions
of law above set forth.
The latest expression of the Supreme Court upon the questions
discussed in this paper-until the very recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. (not yet reported),
announced March 1I, 1912, while this article was in press, but
which will be discussed in a subsequent article-is in Continental
Paper Bag Company v. Eastern Paper Bag Company." There the
plaintiff sued to restrain the defendant from infringing letters pat-
ent. The defendant, among its defenses, answered that the patent
had never been used by the plaintiff. Upon appeal from a decree
ordering an injunction and an accounting the Supreme Court
affirmed the decree. Justice McKenna, giving the opinion of the
Court, stated that the defendant's argument, insofar as it related to
the defense above mentioned, rested upon the promise that the pol-
icy of the patent laws was to promote the progress of useful arts,
and that the non-use of an invention for the period of the patent "is
not to promote the progress of the useful arts," and that, therefore,
"equity should not give its aid to defeat the policy of the statute,
but remit the derelict patentee to his legal remedy." Discussing
this argument, Justice McKenna referred to the policy evidenced
48 145 Fed., 933.
49 C. C. D., Maryland, 1911, not yet reported.
50Paper Bag Patent Case, 210 U. S., 405 (1908).
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by the constitutional provision relating to inventions, and said
that "all that has been deemed necessary for that purpose, through
the experience of years, has been to provide for an exclusive right
to inventors to make, use and vend their invention. * * * The
language of complete monopoly has been employed." There has
been no qualification, of the right, he continued, except the quali-
fication in the Act of 1832 which required aliens to introduce into
public use in the United States the invention or improvement
within one year from the issuing of a patent thereon-"an
expression which," to quote Justice McKenna, "we may now say,
shows the extent of the right-a right so explicitly given and so
complete that it would seem to need no further explanation than
the word of the statute." Justice McKenna added that "the only
effect of the patent is to restrain others from manufacturing and
using that which he has invented," and in support of his view, that
the essence of the patent right was complete "monopoly" and an
"exclusive use," he quoted from United States v. Bell Telephone-
Co.," as follows:
"Counsel seem to argue that one who has made an invention
and thereupon applies for a patent therefor occupies, as it were,
the position of a quasi-trustee for the public; that he is under a
sort of moral obligation to see that the public acquires the right
to the free use of that invention as soon as is conveniently possi-
ble. We dissent entirely from the thought thus urged. The
inventor is one who has discovered something of value. It is his
absolute property. He may withhold a knowledge of it from the
public, and he may insist upon all the advantages and benefits
which the statute promises to him who discloses to the public his
invention."
Justice McKenna then continued:
"And the same relative rights of the patentee and the public
were expressed in prior cases, and we cite them because there is
something more than the repetition of the same thought by doing
so. It shows that whenever this Court has had occasion to speak
it has decided that an inventor receives from a patent the right to
exclude others from its use for the time prescribed in the statute.
'And for his exclusive enjoyment of it during that time the public
faith is forever pledged.' (Chief Justice Marshall in Grant v.
Raymond, 6 Pet., 243, p. 242).
"And in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How., 539, 549, Chief
Justice Taney said: 'The franchise which the patent grants con-
51167 U. S., 224, 249.
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sists altogether in the right to exclude everyone from making,
using or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the
patentee. This is all that he obtains by the patent.'"
To the same effect, Justice McKenna cited numerous other
cases, including Bement v. National Harrow Company, and the
language therein adopted from Heaton-Peninsular Co. v. Eureka
Specialty Co., which has been hereinbefore quoted. Justice
McKenna concluded his argument as follows:
"As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded from the
use of the new patent, we answer that exclusion may be said to
have been the very essence of the right conferred by the patent,
as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use
it, without question of motive.
'5 2
VI.
Summing up the matter, the first proposition of law above set
forth seems well settled. The third proposition of law above set
forth, upon the present state of the authorities, is also well estab-
lished. The only modification seriously urged in respect to it
would, at most, merely save from contributory infringement suits
parties who furnish general articles of 'ommerce to the users of
patented articles. Whatever bearing this possible modification
.may have on the third proposition above mentioned, it appears,
upon analysis, to throw little light on the relation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act to the patent law. The second proposition of
law above set forth, upon the present state of the authorities, is
also well established; but in respect to this second proposition, and
also the third proposition above mentioned, the contention has
been advanced in some quarters that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
forbids the owner of a patent to agree with another to restrain his
own use of the patent and his manufacture and sale of the pat-
ented article. 8
52 To the same effect see:
Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., U. S. Supreme Court, March 11, 1912 (not
yet reported.
Fuller v. Berger, 120 Fed., 274 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1903).
Lewis Blind Stitch Machine Co. v. Premium Mfg. Co., 163 Fed., 950
(C. C. A., 8th C., 1908).
5t See the bills in equity filed on behalf of the Government in United
States v. General Electric Co., and Others (C. C. N. D., Ohio, 1911), and
in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. et al. (C. C. D., Massa-
chusetts, 1911).,
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This contention rests, at bottom, upon two assumptions: first,
that the suppression of the use of a patent is against public policy;
and second, that suppression of competition among the owners
of different patents of the same general character is against public
policy. Both these assumptions are disproved by the great weight
of authority.5
4
Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, it has repeatedly been held
that any trader may cease doing business, but that he cannot agree
with other traders that he and such other traders cease doing
business to such a degree as to constitute restraint of trade."5
The reason underlying this principle is briefly this: Cessation
from business, pursuant to agreement, is unlawful when practised
to such a degree as to constitute restraint of 'trade, because it
tends to monopolize "part of the trade or commerce among the
several states"-to wit, that "part of the trade or commerce" com-
prehended within the business which has ceased-and such
monopolizing is forbidden by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Non-
use of a patent, pursuant to agreement, as Judge Lurton so clearly
has shown in the passages above quoted from Heaton-Peninsular
Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co.; Henry v. A. B.
Dick Company (not yet reported), and John D. Park & Sons
Co. v. Hartman, cannot ipso facto constitute a restraint of
5 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. (quoted
supra).
Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., U. S. Supreme Court, March 11, 1912 (not
yet reported.
Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co.
(quoted supra).
Fuller v. Berger, 120 Fed., 274 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1903).
Rubber Tire Vehicle Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co. (quoted
supra).
Lewis Blind Stitch Machine Co. v. Premium Manufacturing Co., 163
Fed., 950 (C. C. A., 8th C., 1908).
Goshen Rubber Works Co. v. Single Tube A. & B. Tire Co., 166 Fed.,
431 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1908).
55 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S., 290
(1897).
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S., 221 (1899).
United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S., 505 (1898).
Northern Securities Company v. United States, 193 U. S., 197 (1904).
Cincinnati Packet Company v. Bay, 200 U. S., 179 (1906).
Standard Oil Company of New York v. United States' 221 U. S., 1
(1911).
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S., 106 (1911),
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trade. Non-use of a patent, whether pursuant to agreement
or not, and regardless of the kind or number of patents affected,
can at most tend only to monopolize the use of the patent and
the manufacture and sale of the patented article; and such
monopolizing is expressly authorized by the Constitution and the
patent laws enacted thereunder. Everyone must concede that
the non-use of any patent, or any number of patents§, without any
agreement, tends merely to monopolize the use of the patent and
the manufacture and sale of the patented article, and is therefore
lawful. How, then, is such non-use, pursuant to an agreement,
any different from or more excessive than monopolizing the use
of the patent and the manufacture and sale of the patented arti-
cle? Why does such non-use, pursuant to agreement, exceed the
immunity which the Constitution and the patent law grants to
monopolizing or in any way incur the penalties of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act? How or why non-use of patents, pursuant to
agreement, is more monopolizing than non-use without agreement
has never been explained in any decided case or by any legal or
economic authority. On the contrary, sound legal and economic
authority, as well as common sense, hold that non-use of a patent,
whether pursuant to agreement or not, does not exceed the
immunity which the Constitution and the patent law grants to the
monopolizing of the use of the patent and the manufacture and
sale of the patented article. As Judge Baker tersely put it
(Rubber Tire Vehicle Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co.):
"Over and above an absolute monopoly created by law, how
can there be a further and unlawful monopoly in the same thing?
* * * Is a greater injury or deprivation inflicted if plaintiff author-
izes a combination or pool to do what plaintiff can do directly?
To say yes means that substance is disregarded, that mere words
confer upon the people some sort of a right or interest counter to
the monopoly."56
This proposition is confirmed by Chief Justice White's discus-
sion of the'fundamental principles involved in the decisions of the
Supreme Court in Standard Oil Company of New York v. United
56 Compare:
Bement v. National Harrow Co. (quoted supra).
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. (quoted supra).
Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., U. S. Supreme Court (not yet reported).
Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. z. Eureka Specialty Co.
(quoted supra).
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States,57 and United States v. Amnerican Tobacco Co.'s In a bril-
liant historical passage in his opinion in the former case, Chief
Justice White reviewed the course by which the term "restraint
of trade" had come to be a generic term for every kind of monop-
olizing act, and summed up the matter as follows:
"Contracts or acts which it was considered, had a monopolistic
tendency, especially those which were thought to unduly diminish
competition and hence to enhance prices-in other words, to
monopolize-came also in a generic sense to be spoken of and
treated as they had been in England as restricting the due course
of trade, and therefore as being in restraint of trade." (57)
"It resulted that treating such acts as we have said as amount-
ing to monopoly, sometimes constitutional restrictions, again legis-
lative enactments or judicial decisions, served to enforce and
illustrate the purpose to prevent the occurrence of the evils recog-
nized in the mother country as consequent upon monopoly, by pro-
viding against contracts or acts of individuals or combinations
of individuals or corporations deemed to be conducive to such
results." (57).
Referring to the language of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act the
Chief Justice continued:
"The context manifests that the statute was drawn in the light
of the existing practical conception of the law of restraint of
trade, because it groups as within that class, not only contracts
which were in restraint of trade in the subjective sense, but all
contracts or acts which theoretically were attempts to monopolize,
yet which in practice had come to be considered as in restraint of
trade in a broad sense." (59).
"Undoubtedly, the words 'to monopolize' and 'monopolize' as
used in the section reach every act bringing about the prohibited
results. The ambiguity, if any, is involved in determining what
is intended by monopolize. But this ambiguity is readily dispelled
in the light of the previous history of the law of restraint of trade
to which we have referred and the indication which it gives of
the practical evolution by which monopoly and the acts which
produce the same result as monopoly, that is, an undue restraint
of the course of trade, all came to be spoken of as, and to be
indeed synonymous with, restraint of trade. In other words,
having by the first section forbidden all means of moriopolizing
trade, that is, unduly restraining it by means of every contract,
combination, etc., the second section seeks, if possible, to make
the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and perfect by
embracing all attempts to reach the end-prohibited by the first
57221 U. S., 1 (1911).
-8 22i "U. S., 106 (1911).
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section, that is, restraints of trade, by any attempt to monopolize,
or monopolization thereof, even although the acts by which such
results are attempted to be brought about or are brought about
be not embraced within the general enumeration of the first sec-
tion." (61).
The gravamen of the crime defined by the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act is, therefore, monopolizing-that is, unduly excluding others
from using or manufacturing or selling in competition with one's
own use, manufacture and sale; or, conversely, unduly excluding
one's self from using or manufacturing or selling in competition
with another's use, manufacture or sale. All the old doctrine, devel-
oped in many of the cases antedating the Standard Oil Company
v. United States and United States v. American Tobacco Com-
pany, to the effect that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act declared
criminal certain acts which amounted to something less than or
different from monopolizing, as thus defined, was swept away by
these decisions. "Restraint of trade," and all the rest of the
language in which the Sherman Anti-Trust Act defines the crime
which it punishes, means nothing, then, except monopolizing,
unduly excluding others from using or manufacturing or selling
in competition with one's own use, manufacture or sale; or, con-
versely, unduly excluding one's self from using or manufacturing
or selling in competition with another's use, manufacture or sale.
Article I, Section 8, Subdivision 8 of the Constitution provides
that Congress shall have power "to promote the progress of
science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." The right conferred by this Constitutional pro-
vision and the statutes enacted in pursuance of it "consists"-to
quote Chief Justice Taney, in the passage which Justice McKenna
cited from Bloom v. McQuewan (14 How., 539, 549)-alto-
gether in the right to exclude everyone from making, using or
vending the thing patented without the permission of the pat-
entee." This constitutional guaranty to the patentee flatly con-
tradicts the prohibition of the Sherman Act. There is no recon-
ciling the two. They are mutually inconsistent. One must yield
to the other. Between the constitutional guaranty, on the one
hand, and the Act of' Congress of July 2, 189o, known as the
Sherman Act, on the other hand, there can be no question of pre-
cedence. It cannot be assumed that the Sherman Act intended
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to interfere with rights established by the Constitution and
granted by the patent law.5 9
The constitutional guaranty must prevail. The owner of a
patent may, in any measure whatsoever, exclude others from
using his patent, and from manufacturing or selling the patented
article. The owner of a patent may do all the acts compre-
hended in the three propositions of law above set forth; and even
though such acts be monopolizing, and such as, without the
immunity of a patent, would clearly constitute a violation of the
Sherman Act, the Constitution and the patent laws shall be his
protection.
Gilbert H. Montague.
New York City, 55 Liberty Street. March, 1912.
"Bement v. National Harrow Company (quoted supra).
Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., U. S. Supreme Court, March 11, 1912 (not
yet reported), to be discussed in a subsequent article.
Rubber Tire Vehicle Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co. (quoted
supra).
Indiana Manufacturing Co. v. I. L Case Threshing Machine Co.
(quoted supra).
John D. Parks & Sons Co. v. Hartman (quoted supra).
